Abstract: This paper examines the indefinite preventative detention of non-citizens in the UK, arguing that the reasoning of the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department has not been applied within the crime control context. This paper analyses the jurisprudence in relation to indefinite preventive detention in the (non-terrorism) immigration context, arguing that whilst ideas emerging in anti-terrorism law have influenced immigration law, in a wider context, beyond terrorism, the internal logic of immigration control which justifies its discriminatory coercion with assertion of the sovereign right of the state to exclude aliens, has caused resistance to the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in A in regard to the preventive detention of non-citizens. It contends that the UK's reliance on these principles is undermined by the fact that the UK has exercised its sovereignty to expressly limit it through its ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments.
A. INTRODUCTION
"Democracy values each person equally. In most respects, this means that the will of the majority must prevail. But valuing each person equally also means that the will of the majority cannot prevail if it is inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities… No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But substitute 'black', 'disabled', 'female', 'gay', or any other similar adjective for 'foreign' before 'suspected international terrorist' and ask whether it would be justifiable to take power to lock up that group but not the 'white', 'able-bodied', 'male' or 'straight' suspected international terrorists. The answer is clear". This article examines why the logic of the reasoning of the House of Lords regarding nationality discrimination in A has been resistant to the context of preventive detention of non-citizens under immigration powers. Section B sets out the issues and Section C analyses these issues and their conceptual underpinning. This paper argues that this resistance against applying the principles in A to preventive detention in the immigration context has not only led to policy effects that are indefensible in terms of risk management, but that the basis of the resistance is at best reliant on a false premise -that the preventively detained non-citizen is imprisoned within a "prison with three walls" -and at worst is unprincipled and results from the deference afforded to the Executive in the area of immigration by the doctrine of territorial state sovereignty. In any event, the current legal approach to preventive detention of non-citizens is flawed and is incompatible with fundamental principles such as equality before the law and the security of the person. 
B. THE ISSUES

Not Conducive to the Public Good a) Statutory powers of detention
The State considers whether the automatic detention provision applies, and where they have decided that it does apply, pending the making of the deportation order.
b) Policy
The Drugs Offences (Bournemouth Commitment) 7 "As has been set out above, public protection is a key consideration underpinning our detention policy. Where an ex-foreign national prisoner meets the criteria for consideration of deportation, the presumption in favour of temporary admission or temporary release may well be outweighed by the risk to the public of harm from reoffending or the risk of absconding, evidenced by a past history of lack of respect for the law."
In paragraph 55.3.1 whether "there a risk of offending or harm to the public" is listed as a relevant consideration when considering whether or not to detain, and paragraph 55.3.1 strongly emphasises that "substantial weight" should be given to the risk of further offending and the risk of harm to the public. were no airlines willing to accept passengers being forcibly returned to Somalia. In addition, the ECtHR had indicated that he should not be deported pending a decision in another case, and he also had an outstanding domestic appeal against the Secretary of State's refusal to revoke the deportation order. Despite these factors, Toulson and Keene LJJ gave particular weight to the fact that the appellant had refused to accept voluntary repatriation, whilst the reasons for his refusal were deemed to be irrelevant. 47 Protecting the public from the risk of reoffending was also held to be a relevant consideration, in the words of Toulson LJ:
"Mr Drabble submitted that the purpose of the power of detention was not for the protection of public safety. In my view that is over-simplistic. The purpose of the power of deportation is to remove a person who is not entitled to be in the United
Kingdom and whose continued presence would not be conducive to the public good.
If the reason why his presence would not be conducive to the public good is because of a propensity to commit serious offences, protection of the public from that risk is the purpose of the deportation order and must be a relevant consideration when determining the reasonableness of detaining him pending his removal or departure."
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In
R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Dyson
LJ held that the detention of the appellant for fifteen and a half months was reasonable in the circumstances because of the risk of absconding and reoffending, notwithstanding the fact that there was "no immediate prospect that the deportation will take place". 49 not be confined to circumstances where the purpose is to facilitate deportation, observing that facilitating deportation "is often the, or one of the, reasons for doing so." Counsel for the appellants had argued that the risk of offending could not be the sole justification for detention, as the purpose of detention was to facilitate deportation, not to prevent offending.
Lord Phillips examined the issue of why detention was permitted to prevent offending, provided that it had been originally authorised to facilitate deportation, commenting that:
f the risk of re-offending can be the determinant factor in deciding how long it is reasonable to detain a FNP why should it not be the determinant, or even the sole reason for detaining him in the first place? Why should it be a pre-condition to the power to detain that its use is to facilitate deportation, even if this is not the real reason for detention, as in the case of Chahal? It is that logical inconsistency that underlies the challenge that is made on behalf of Mr Lumba in the present case to the legitimacy of having regard to the risk of his re-offending."
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As it is made in passing, and in the context of years of jurisprudence which has allowed an extraordinary latitude to the Executive in exercise of its immigration detention powers, finding lengthy periods of detention to be reasonable and lawful, the admission that the real reason for detention in Chahal 55 was actually public protection -deportation within a reasonable period of time never being a real and practical possibility -is easily missed, but is nonetheless a startling statement.
Chahal v UK is remembered for establishing the absolute nature of the principle of non-refoulement in Article 3 cases concerning deportation to a country where the applicant faces a risk of torture. Following Chahal, states are prohibited from weighing national security considerations against the individual's Article 3 right to be free from torture.
However, in Chahal the ECtHR held that the applicant's detention for a period of over five years following the making of a deportation order against him was lawful and the length of detention was not excessive in breach of Article 5(1)(f), as the Secretary of State had acted with due diligence in pursuing deportation proceedings. The prolonged period was lawful because of its link to deportation, yet Lord Phillips casts that purpose aside, considering the detention to be, in reality, preventive detention.
The absolute nature of the prohibition of deportation to a country where there is a risk that the deportee will suffer torture has led to the UK using preventive detention as an alternative to breaching its non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The irony of this is not lost on the Equal Rights
Trust, which, in its report "Unravelling Anomaly -Detention, Discrimination and the protection needs of Stateless Persons" 56 comments:"[h]owever, the problem often faced by stateless persons is that even though they may benefit from the principle of non-refoulement, the alternative they are often afforded is one which also violates their rights -continued detention" 57 The Equal Rights Trust argues that indefinite detention is a form of inhuman and degrading treatment in itself and therefore "it is obvious that resorting to indefinite detention in order to protect a person from possible torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in another country is absurd.
If the motivation to not refoul persons is based on a commitment to protect them from The jurisprudence of the UK courts and the ECtHR confirms that the foundational principle of the statutory immigration powers is territorial sovereignty, and that this provides wide discretion for the Secretary of State to detain aliens. The right to exclude from its territory, and to control admission to and residence in its territory, is fundamental to the modern nation state, and appears to create a partial shield against judicial scrutiny, under which a lower standard of review is applied in cases involving territorial sovereignty. The state's "undeniable sovereign right to control aliens' entry into and residence in their
territory" 60 appears predominantly to trump the rights of the detained alien throughout the case law, at both domestic and international levels. ii) The Prison with three walls A detainee's refusal to return voluntarily to his or her country of origin is used to construct an argument refuting the discriminatory nature of the preventive detention of non-citizens in circumstances where UK citizens would not be detained. According to this argument, which takes a formal approach to equality, 66 the detention regime is not discriminatory because the with the requisite speed" (para 120) the Court found that the deportation proceedings had been pursued with due diligence and therefore the detention was lawful. irrelevant, when considering the refusal as a factor supporting a finding that a length of detention is reasonable. Therefore, those who would fall into MacDonald's "de facto refugee" category are particularly vulnerable to prolonged and indefinite executive detention in the UK, as their reasons for refusing to accept repatriation are legally irrelevant, but the refusal itself can justify indefinite detention.
The "prison with three walls" argument can be compared to the arguments based on the state's "undeniable sovereign right" to control aliens. Both lines of reasoning allow for a different set of rules to govern the state's powers over non-citizens, and for a lower standard of human rights protection to be applicable in the context of immigration control. Human rights are in theory universal, and protect everyone by virtue of being human -they are not conditional on citizenship. This is reflected in Article 1 of the ECHR, which provides that state parties "shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." However, it seems that in the context of immigration control, states are not required to secure the same standards of the protection of liberty to non-citizens that they would be required to secure for non-citizens outside this context.
Nationality Discrimination, Irrationality and the Principle of Proportionality
In of the ECHR because it unlawfully discriminated on grounds of nationality or immigration status. As the impugned provisions applied only to non-citizens, when the threat from international terrorism emanated from British so-called "home-grown" terrorists as well as from non-citizens, they could not be a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting the public from acts of international terrorism. There was no rational connection between the means used and the aim sought to be realised, hence the measures were ineffective as well as discriminatory on the basis of nationality or immigration status.
This landmark case presents an interesting analogy to the situation of non-citizens whose deportation is prevented by practical or legal impediments, but are detained for reasons of public protection under immigration powers. The reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in A could be applied to such cases of indefinite preventive detention of non-70 A (n 1).
citizens. However, this jurisprudence has yet to be extended to cases of preventive detention under immigration powers outside the counter-terrorism context. Therefore the finding that indefinite detention of non-citizens without charge was, inter alia, a breach of Article 14 of the ECHR, the subsequent release of the applicants, and the adoption of a control order regime has created a paradoxical situation in which two groups which are similarly situated are treated differently: those who are suspected of terrorism cannot be detained whereas those who are thought to present a lower, and even a very low, risk to the public are subjected to indefinite detention.
The effect of law and policy in the areas of immigration, asylum, and terrorism has therefore been that preventive detention of those who are considered to pose the greatest risk to the public and to national security is prohibited, whilst those non-citizens who pose even a small risk of non-terrorism related crime can be detained indefinitely on preventive grounds.
The reasoning of the House of Lords regarding discrimination on the basis of nationality or immigration status can also be applied to the latter group, as British nationals who have finished their sentence but are at risk of reoffending cannot be detained, and there is no rational basis for this, given that the same threat to public safety can be presented by both groups.
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The ECtHR's doctrine of proportionality requires that any measure or action restricting rights under the ECHR to pursue a legitimate aim be suitable to achieve the legitimate aim and be necessary to achieve that aim. Finally, the restriction of the right must be proportionate to the aim pursued, being the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate aim. 72 The final stage of this test involves examining whether the measure or action strikes a proper balance between the aim pursued and the individual's rights. The indefinite detention of non-citizens who cannot be deported on grounds of public protection is not proportionate in that it is not an appropriate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of protecting the public, it is not the least restrictive means and does not have a rational connection with the legitimate aim because the threat of crime does not come exclusively, or even mainly from non-citizens. 73 Finnis argues that the reasoning of the majority in A v this is sufficient to meet the condition that action is being taken with a view to deportation.
In the case of A, ministers had been seeking diplomatic assurances from the Governments of the applicants' countries of origin that they would not be subjected to ill treatment if returned. Finnis considers that the seeking of diplomatic assurances constituted action with a view to deportation and was being taken, as this could remove the risk that they would be subjected to inhuman treatment or torture. Indeed, the House of Lords has since expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of such diplomatic assurances. 79 According to Finnis, the impugned measures in the case of the Belmarsh detainees did not discriminate on the basis of nationality, because the detainees were wrongly assumed to be in the same position as British citizens who cannot be deported, when in fact they may be able to be deported at some future time. Finnis accepts that the detainees in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department were in the same position as other immigration detainees against whom deportation proceedings are being taken, but he believes that in most deportation cases indefinite detention can be justified on the grounds that action is being taken with a view to deportation, notwithstanding that deportation may not currently be possible.
C. ANALYSIS
Security, Risk and "Pre-crime"
In recent years, there has been a paradigmatic shift within criminology in which a securitybased analysis of crime has become predominant -this has led to changes in criminal justice policy. Zedner sees the foundations of this change in the rational choice theory of economics and observes that this field of economics is having increasing influence within sociology.
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Under this security-based analysis, crime is a rational choice -the product of a cost-benefit calculation -and is therefore morally neutral. This view, Zedner comments, is popular not only because it explains the failure of the deviancy criminological model but also because in emphasising agency and the freedom of the individual it is consistent with the dominant political philosophy of neo-liberalism.
This view has far-reaching implications for criminal justice policy, displacing the traditional justifications for punishment and undermining the basis of the system of post-hoc justice which has been constructed over centuries. Retribution and rehabilitation are no longer convincing reasons for punishment, because crime is no longer seen as immoral but instead as a morally neutral rational choice. As Zedner points out, under a security-based analysis even deterrence no longer appears to be a credible justification for punishment, given that for some socially excluded and disadvantaged populations the unlikely prospect of imprisonment provides little disincentive to committing crime, because they have very little to lose. 81 It could be argued that this is particularly true for irregular migrants, as they are not permitted to access employment or public funds, and are often subjected to particular controls such as reporting and residence requirements. Indeed, whilst in detention they may actually have greater access to 'goods' such as employment opportunities, education and training, and healthcare services, than they would if they were not detained. The term "pre-crime" was coined by Philip K. Dick in his 1956 science-fiction short story "Minority Report", 83 in which he writes of a society which has eradicated crime by predicting crimes through the use of "precogs" -humans who have precognition ability -and then detaining the prospective offenders before the crimes are committed. The reorientation of the criminal justice system from a retrospective system, which investigates, tries, and punishes, to a prospective system of anticipating crime, assessing risk, and reducing opportunities for offending is a logical consequence of the adoption of the security-based analysis of crime. If crime is a rational choice, the state can only hope to reduce it by intervening before an offence is even conceived, reducing temptation, and increasing the costs to be entered into the cost-benefit analysis. Increasing the severity of punishment will only deter those who are the most risk-averse, given the low chances of being caught.
Therefore, the state should engage in profiling of risky populations, and target them with surveillance and other control measures, with the intention that the profiled group will commit less crime because they have been made aware of their profile and the concomitant increase in the likelihood of detection.
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From the amoral standpoint of security analysis, taking pre-emptive measures is straightforward. However, if one steps away from this view, several distinct but interconnected difficulties with this approach become apparent. First, there is a danger that identifying populations which pose a higher risk of committing crime the state further stigmatises the most disadvantaged groups in society, as these are the groups which are more likely to make a rational choice to commit crime, given that they have the least to lose.
Furthermore, as disincentives are less effective on those with the least to lose, preemptive incapacitation becomes the most attractive method of dealing with such groups.
Secondly, the act of profiling the most disadvantaged has an inherent risk of entrenching social exclusion and deprivation, which in turn may increase the perceived risk, leading to a perpetual ratcheting up of pre-emptive coercive measures against the targeted groups.
Thirdly, the act of profiling can be politicised, with popular demands for unpopular minorities to be profiled and subjected to ever-more stringent controls. Indeed, the ancillary effects of profiling of the targeted groups may increase their risk because their labelling as a high-risk group leads to their further social exclusion and embedding of their pariah status, pril14.pdf> accessed 30 May 2014, and they have no recourse to public funds, including local authority housing. For a (non-exhaustive) list of the benefits included in the definition of "public funds" see <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-funds--2> accessed 30 May 2014. 83 Philip K Dick, Minority Report (Gollancz, 2000) . 84 Criminal Justice (n 70) 290.
leaving them with few options but crime, and almost no disincentives. When an individual is already treated like a criminal, to be convicted of and punished for a criminal offence may be of trivial significance. There is also the intractable problem of the potential for profiling to become a self-fulfilling prophecy in that those who are the subject of increased surveillance and other pre-emptive actions will almost inevitably become the groups with the highest crime rates, because of the increase in detection amongst this group vis-à-vis the general population. 85 "Counter-terrorism and the pre-crime framework it animates formalizes the selffulfilling prophesy of selective law enforcement by embedding pre-emption into formal law, increasing police powers and increasing the intensity and duration of coercion linked to police discretion and action."
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Increasing the coercive powers of the state has also been taking place outside the counter-terrorism context, with pre-emptive coercive measures being used within the immigration control context; using immigration powers to achieve a pre-emptive solution to crime control in the policing of non-citizens. The security paradigm is consistent with a utilitarian view of criminal justice in that it prioritises the benefit to wider society over the rights of the individual to be free from the coercive powers of the state if they have not committed a criminal offence, as Zedner observes:
"although security, in the objective sense of protection from threat, is posed as a universal good, it is predicated upon that which threatens and its pursuit entails the identification, targeting, and exclusion of those deemed to threaten (Crawford, 1998b). The consequent potential for social exclusion is exacerbated by the common tendency, both individual and collective, to overstate exposure to risk and hence to 85 The benefit of security for the majority is held out as trumping the rights of the minority groups that are likely to find themselves targeted by the state in its pursuit of security. In this way, a construction of the majority and minority is created, setting "us" -law abiding, upstanding, and familiar apart from "them" -the suspect, dangerous, other. 89 Like utilitarianism, the security paradigm is also vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority criticism. It is perhaps ironic that the epithet "security" is also used by classical liberalism to denote security of the individual from the arbitrary use of the coercive powers of the state.
Territorial State Sovereignty
International human rights law is founded on the principle that human rights are universal; . 89 There are some parallels to be found here with Bentham's contention that where the perpetrator cannot be punished, punishing an innocent person for a crime that has been committed is justified by the benefit to the wider community of doing so. As measures taken in the pursuit of security have the potential to make the majority feel more secure or at least that action is being taken to decrease the threat of crime, the detriments suffered by the minorities who are targeted by the measures are outweighed in the felicific calculus. in becoming a party to the human rights instrument, has agreed to bind itself in a manner which, it could be argued, is a curtailment of its sovereignty but the consent to be bound can itself, as an expression of the will of the democratic polity, be seen as an indication that this is consistent with the sovereignty of the state.
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The concept of state sovereignty is intimately bound up with territoriality and the idea of the nation state, defining itself through, inter alia, the power to exclude and include, and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. 93 Cornelisse tracks the development of the concept of territorial sovereignty from Medieval Europe to the present day, finding that the process of establishing an independent territorial state system, which began with the Peace of Westphalia, coincided with the development of the concept of a sovereign body politic uniting the ruler and the ruled, and that the two concepts fused to create the modern sovereign nation state. Rousseau's conception of popular sovereignty, which according to Cornelisse
"cannot be outdone", accepts the absolutist nature of sovereignty which Hobbes' theory entailed, but the absolute power is vested in the people, who only exist if they exist within a community:
"The state is the community, but as the people possess exclusive and omnipotent sovereignty that is inalienable, government is merely the executor of the general will of the community."
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Cornelisse argues that, just as the general will of the community was replaced by Hegel with the national will, nationalism shaped the role of the State, which became associated with the nation: "by the end of the nineteenth century, sovereignty, territory and the identity of the political community became inextricably linked."
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The influence of these philosophers can be seen in the discourse which justifies indefinite immigration detention for the purpose of preventing crime. in order to gain protection to remove them from lives that were "nasty, brutish and short." 96 The security-based analysis of crime, which sees crime as a natural, rational choice, can be viewed as a school of criminology that has its roots in Hobbesian philosophy. It can provide a philosophical underpinning for the use of preventive detention measures against non-citizens.
A Hobbesian security-based analysis may determine that aliens residing in the territory of the state are not party to the social contract and therefore are liable to experience the coercive powers of the state in order to prevent crime, but are not beneficiaries of the contract, save for the indirect benefit that they may derive from the state's exercise of power establishing law and order.
Slippage of Concepts
In law, as in other areas of life, people have a tendency to introduce concepts from one area into another and fuse them together, as well as using their separate discourses to influence outcomes in litigation, policy and other decision-making processes. with asylum and immigration, in some cases equating terrorists and asylum seekers. 105 The
United Nations has made reference to asylum seekers and refugees in most of its resolutions on combating terrorism. 106 Tumlin has analysed the impact of terrorism policy on immigration policy in the US context, and found that immigration powers have been used in terrorism investigations because they offer fewer procedural safeguards than the criminal procedures. Although similar in its nationality discrimination and consequent irrationality and disproportionality, the use of immigration detention for the purpose of preventive detention has pursued crime control aims through immigration law, rather than criminal law. This has meant that the territorial sovereignty discourse has prevented the logic of the reasoning of the majority in A from being applied in the context of the use of the immigration powers of detention for the purpose of preventing the committing of (general non-terrorism related)
crime. The link between immigration law and criminal law is not formalised in the case of preventively detained ex-FNPs, in that criminal law provisions are not used for detention, rather powers of detention, which are corollary to the power to deport, are used to detain. In this way, the link to the state's "undeniable sovereign right" to control and exclude aliens from its territory serves to legitimise the detention and make it subject to a lower standard of human rights protection. This lower standard is characterised as "proportionality lite" by Cornelisse: in the assessment of whether a measure is suitable to achieve the aim, the ECtHR does not look for a causal link between the immigration detention and its aims but a "close The disapplication of due process norms and human rights in the context of the preventive detention of ex-FNPs finds support from the security-based analysis of crime, and in the utilitarian felicific calculus. The citizen population can feel an increased sense of security because a category of ex-offenders are preventively detained, but because that category is limited to non-citizens, the potential damage to the security of the citizens in the sense of increased anxiety that one is more vulnerable to interference by the state with one's liberty and security, is minimised. This use of preventive detention can also find justification in the security-based analysis of crime as it is premised upon detaining on the basis of a risk analysis, although its confinement to non-citizens is not easily justified by the security-based analysis, as this restriction of the use of preventive detention is not based on risk, since citizens can also present a risk of crime.
McCulloch and Pickering examine the effects of the integration of security and national security into criminal justice, arguing that:
"the move to pre-crime that is taking place embodies not only a trend towards integrating security into criminal justice, but also integrating national security into criminal justice. The shift from post to pre-crime and national security under counterterrorism frameworks encompasses not only a temporal shift, but also a geographic one that involves a blurring of the borders between the states' internal and external coercive capacities."
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This blurring of the internal and external coercive capacities of the state can cause the further isolation of the irregular migrant, as the states' inherent right in international law to control immigration is emphasised in its exercise of internal coercive capacities against non-citizens.
D. CONCLUSION
Theoretically, the power of the Executive to detain the non-citizen is a corollary to the power of the Executive to deport the non-citizen, and must always be used to facilitate deportation.
However, barriers to removal can increase the length of detention of a non-citizen, which becomes indefinite preventive detention because a risk of the non-citizen offending is deemed relevant to any decision to detain or release. Considerations of public protection and the risk of the detainee committing crime if released are deemed relevant to the initial decision to detain, the administrative decision whether to release, as well as the judicial determination of bail applications and unlawful detention judicial review actions.
Arguments that administrative preventive detention of non-citizens is not discriminatory are based on what is in many cases a false premise: that the detainee is not in an analogous situation to a UK citizen who poses a risk of offending, because the UK citizen cannot be deported. In cases where there are barriers which render deportation impossible, the administrative detention of the non-citizen in circumstances in which the citizen could not be detained, the facts cannot be distinguished from A if it was possible to predict with "high degree of certainty that, upon release, the detainee would commit murder or mayhem" 114 then this would justify a lengthy period of detention.
Although the modern nation state's fusion of territoriality and sovereignty may have occurred by happenstance, the role of territoriality in linking the state and the nation is key and has emphasised the state's right to exclude and control aliens. Notwithstanding the human rights obligations of the state being voluntarily assumed through its ratification of human rights instruments, the sovereignty of the state is invoked to reduce judicial scrutiny and allow for a lower standard of protection of the liberty of a non-citizen in the context of immigration control.
The administrative preventive detention of non-citizens can be seen as part of a trend to use immigration law to achieve crime control and security aims, as states take advantage of the lower standard of scrutiny that the invoking of territorial sovereignty allows immigration powers to enjoy. Immigration powers have been used in criminal investigations because they offer fewer procedural safeguards compared with criminal law procedures. In A the direct import of immigration law into a criminal law provision was successfully resisted; however, the use of immigration detention powers for the purpose of criminal justice or public protection outside the counter-terrorism context has circumvented the criminal law and its higher standard of review by not formalising a link with criminal law provisions. Although the purported purpose of the detention is to prevent crime, it is authorised under immigration law. The use of immigration law to achieve the purpose of crime control has enabled territorial sovereignty principles to dominate the discourse and prevent the logic of the reasoning in A from being applied to administrative detention of non-citizens in the context of crime control. This is paradoxical because the different treatment which results -between the treatment of irregular migrants who are suspected of terrorist activities and those whom the state contends pose a risk of committing non-terrorist offences -eventuates, notwithstanding that in A Lord Bingham expressly stated that the use of an immigration measure to address a security problem could not be proportionate, both because of its discriminatory effect and because this discriminatory effect undermined its effectiveness.
Although its confinement to non-citizens is not easily justified, the preventive detention of non-citizens is supported by the security-based pre-crime agenda, because it is premised upon detainment on the basis of a risk assessment (even if in practice this is often done based on out of date information on the risk that an FNP poses). It also finds justification in the utilitarian felicific calculus. Citizens, the majority group, can feel an increased sense of security because a category of ex-offenders are preventively detained, but because that category is limited to non-citizens, the potential damage to the security of the citizens -in the classical liberal sense of increased anxiety that one is more vulnerable to interference by the state with one's liberty and security -is minimised.
It seems that arguments based on a strong notion of territorial sovereignty often prevent challenges to the indefinite preventive detention of non-citizens; a more realistic interpretation of the importance of the principle of territorial sovereignty would be to view it in the context of the state's international obligations, which the state has voluntarily assumed, and to consider territorial sovereignty considerations alongside other constitutional principles, such as the rule of law and equality before the law. Territorial sovereignty may appear to enable popular punitivism and security-based approaches predicated on pre-emption and discrimination, including indefinite preventive detention of non-citizens by the Executive.
Security-based risk analysis approaches to crime control are vulnerable to a number of criticisms, including that they are inevitably discriminatory and entrench disadvantage, and that they lead to the tyranny of the majority. If the lack of suitability is recognised, with preemptive measures that are discriminatory having the inherent risk of not being fit for purpose, then the preventive detention of non-citizens becomes difficult to justify, even according to the lower standard of scrutiny that territorial sovereignty considerations entail, because its efficiency as a preventive crime control strategy can be questioned. The individual citizen is traditionally identified with the state, in the body politic of the ruler and the ruled; the state is often required to enable the will of the majority to prevail, but, in the words of Lady Hale, "the will of the majority cannot prevail if it is inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities."
